On October 1, 1963, Nigeria was recognized as a republic; however, this did not begin Nigeria’s political journey as a Republican state. Nigeria’s first republic began on October 1, 1960, when the country achieved independence, and ended on January 15, 1966, during the first military coup d’état.
During its time of independence, Nigeria possessed all the characteristics of a democratic state and was regarded as a beacon of hope by other African nations. Nigeria had a federal constitution that gave three (later four) regions sufficient autonomy: region, including the north, east, and west; the nation established and maintained a parliamentary democracy based on majority rule; The Bill of Rights was a complicated part of the Constitution; Additionally, Nigeria had a functional multiparty system, albeit regionally based, in contrast to other African states that immediately adopted one-party systems following independence.
An image of the Founding Fathers of the First Republic.
However, due to a number of structural flaws and political crises, Nigeria’s democratic qualities at the time did not guarantee the republic’s survival. People inquire such as: What factors contributed to the demise of Nigeria’s first republic? Why did the first republic of Nigeria fail? What caused Nigeria’s first republic to fall? Etc. These inquiries will be addressed in this article.
The structural flaws that caused Nigeria’s first republic to fall.
1. Ethnically based Federal Regions with Different Sizes and Powers The First Republic of Nigeria’s first structural flaw was its disparate size and power between its ethnically based federal regions. Nigeria had three federating regions upon independence: Regions in the north, east, and west. ( Following a crisis in the West, a new region, the Mid-West, was created later in 1963. One of the three largest ethnic groups in the country ruled each region: Yoruba in the west, Igbo in the east, and Hausa-Fulani in the north. Minorities were severely outnumbered in the regional job and resource competition as a result of this arrangement, which was led by the dominant ethnic groups. It also made it possible for the elites of the three largest ethnic groups to have exclusive access to federal patronage, which they used to gain political support for themselves. A historian of Nigeria’s political parties during this time period asserts that these three regions were constitutionally powerful in addition to being largely independent of the federal government:
The leaders of these dominant nationality groups controlled the means by which they could gain access to wealth and power in their respective regions. They tended to associate their personal interests with the goals of their nationality groups; On the other hand, they used the sentiments of their groups to advance their own personal goals.
The North was the most populous and geographically extensive of the three (see Figure). 1 & Chart 1). As a result, it received more than half of the seats in the federal legislature (see Chart 2). Because of this, a party might be able to lead the country if it only got votes from the North. The Hausa-Fulani elites’ regional outlook was strengthened, and the Yoruba and Igbo elites’ fear of northern hegemony was heightened as a result.
The ethnic divisions that existed throughout the nation were exacerbated by the fact that the federal regions of the country were broadly aligned with one another. Minorities were also excluded from the political and economic structures of each region, and the structural tensions that resulted from the Northern region’s size enough to dominate its two southern counterparts in parliament set the stage for the political conflicts that consumed the First Republic.
2. Emotional ties between political parties and ethno-regional identities were the second structural flaw that plagued the First Republic. As a result, politics “revolved around ethnic-based regional…parties” in large part. Three parties dominated the political scene like titans, reflecting the tripodal ethnic balance, and thus shaped the First Republic’s future: The Action Group, the National Council of Nigerian Citizens, and the Northern People’s Congress (NPC)
Ethnic and cultural connections were the genesis of each of the three parties:
NPC from the Association of Peoples of the North, Jam’iyar Mutanen Arewa, and AG from the Society for the Descendants of Oduduwa, Egbe omo Oduduwa Oduduwa is regarded as the Yoruba people’s ancestral ancestor in Yoruba folklore) NCNC from the Igbo State Union As a result, these three parties and their leaders reflected, shaped, and exacerbated the nation’s ethno-regional divisions.
The three dominant parties The Northern People’s Congress (NPC), which ruled the North, was a “Hausa-Fulani dominated party.” It was the most ingrained in its regional identity of the three parties. This is best demonstrated by its name and the fact that it did not field a single candidate in the other regions of the general election on the eve of independence in 1959.
The primary objective of the NPC was to safeguard the North’s conservative social hierarchy from the “winds of radical change sweeping up from the south.” Ahmadu Bello, a titled prince from the region’s aristocracy, was the party chairman and Regional Premier—Premiers were the political leaders of the Regions, similar to Governors today.
Ahmadu Bello Ahmadu Bello’s party was granted the privilege of forming Nigeria’s first post-independence government after winning the most seats in the 1959 elections. However, it was forced to form a coalition with one of the two main southern parties because it was just short of winning the majority necessary to govern alone (157 seats). As the leader of the NPC, Ahmadu Bello should have been Prime Minister, but he chose to stay as Regional Premier rather than send his deputy, Tafawa Balewa, to Lagos to lead the federal government. This is an example of the constitutional power of the Regions. This would be comparable to a politician today declining a presidential bid in favor of remaining a state governor.
The southern party, the National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC), joined the NPC as a junior partner in government in a coalition. It was a choice for which it was rewarded greatly. Favorable ministerial and ambassadorial positions were awarded to party veterans. For instance, Nnamdi Azikiwe, one of the party’s founders, held the Presidency, which was primarily a ceremonial position, and Festus Okotie-Eboh, the party’s national treasurer, held the Finance ministry.
Nnamdi Azikiwe The NCNC, as its name suggests, initially aspired to project a nationalist, pan-Nigerian image. However, the ethnic regionalism encouraged by the country’s federal structure gradually narrowed the party’s political horizons, and it became increasingly the “voice of Igbo nationalism.” Michael Okpara, the party’s chairman, chose, like the NPC, to stay in his position as Regional Premier after the 1959 election rather than join the federal cabinet. However, the NCNC campaigned in the other two regions during the election, in contrast to the NPC; Together with the Northern Elements Progressive Union, led by Aminu Kano, it won seats in the North and the West.
The final party on our tripartite list is the Action Group (AG). At first, the AG, like the NCNC in the south, wanted to be more than just a regional party. It hoped that its advertised political ideology, “democratic socialism,” would garner support from across the region. However, party elites soon came to the conclusion that “the only certain avenue to power was a regional political party,” enslaved by the political terrain. As a consequence of this, the AG also retreated into its ethnic enclave, never being able to shake its reputation as a platform “to safeguard Yoruba interests.”
It also campaigned outside of its region, like the NCNC in 1959, and won seats by forming alliances with parties from ethnic minority groups: The North has the United Middle-Belt Congress (UMBC), and the East has the Dynamic Party.
Having won the fewest seats out of the three major parties and having performed similarly poorly in its region (only 53% of seats in the Western Region were won by it). As a result, when the country gained independence, the AG formed an opposition party. The party chairman, Awolowo, took over as the opposition’s official leader in the federal parliament. He was the only party chairman to “opt to go to the [federal] center” and let Ladoke Akintola, his deputy, become Regional Premier. However, this choice would cost Awolowo because it made him “particularly vulnerable” to a challenge to his leadership from his deputy.
In 1959, both southern parties made the decision to leave their ethnic enclaves and run candidates across the federation, expressing their hope that the country would become an open constituency for all parties. However, it was also a representation of political reality. “Only the NPC could dominate the federation from its regional base alone” due to the stark disparity in seat allocation. a benefit that neither of the other two parties took advantage of. Consequently, despite the fact that the political culture of the First Republic firmly anchored the AG and the NCNC to their ethnic base, the republic’s asymmetry of parliamentary power forced them to reach out to minorities outside of their regions.
3. The political constellation that emerged following the 1959 election It is possible to argue that the political constellation that emerged following the 1959 election was the structural weakness of the young republic that was most potent. It had a significant impact on the stability of the nation soon to become independent. The NPC and NCNC’s North-South governing coalition, which has been called “unnatural” and “a coalition of strange bedfellows,” only made the republic’s structural imbalances worse.
It was clear from the start that it was an unequal partnership, with the NPC being the more powerful of the two governing parties. Because of this, the NCNC was always very aware of how fragile its share of power was. The fact that politicians from either party viewed members of the opposing side with suspicion, condescension, and even hostility only served to exacerbate the underlying tension that existed between the two leaders of the government. When Yorubas and Igbos “sincerely saw the North as feudal and backward, a brake upon nationalist progress,” and Hausa-Fulanis “sincerely perceived the prospect of Southern domination as a threat to [their]… cultural values,” this was a microcosm of the larger divide between the North and South in Nigerian society shortly after independence. Therefore, the deep cultural divide between the two parties resulted in a governing coalition plagued by “tension and mistrust” to the point where, in the face of multiple crises, the governing alliance repeatedly collapsed.
Thus, the misfortune that befell the AG in opposition is yet another aspect of the structural tension brought about by the political alignment that emerged following 1959.
The AG was “stranded in opposition…without a firm base of power resources” following the election defeat; It also meant that Yoruba elites lost their ability to bargain over how federal patronage is distributed to their region. To show how this is true: “Enhanced entry and promotion for Easterners in the public service and [the] armed forces” appears to have been a component of the “bargain” that the NCNC secured upon joining the government. Losing patronage and being relegated to opposition status would eventually divide the AG into two camps. The first crisis to shake the republic early on was the division of the AG into factions, which highlighted all of its structural tensions, as we will see in the second section.
Obafemi Awolowo.
4. The First Republic’s politics were dominated by the fear of ethnic dominance, which was the final and most significant structural flaw. The Hausa-Fulanis feared that the Yorubas and Igbos in the two southern regions would use the North’s demographic advantage to maintain northern hegemony and monopolize federal resources for their region; In response, Hausa-Fulanis feared that the more educated Yorubas and Igbos would prevail over the federation’s political and economic structures in an open contest.
In a similar vein, the Yoruba and Igbo elites were at odds in the south due to the strong influence of tribalism. Additionally, minority ethnic groups within the three regions endured the suffocating embrace of the three dominant groups.
As a result, Nigeria’s sociopolitical landscape was tense, fractured, and conflicted upon independence in 1960, resembling a “three-player ethnic game” according to Crawford Young. The progress and unity of the nation were hindered by this ethnically charged political competition.
Now let’s talk about the five crises that gradually weakened the foundations of Nigeria’s First Republic and caused it to fall or break up.
1. The AG’s demise from 1962 to 1963 The AG’s loss of political influence from 1962 to 1963 had far-reaching effects. The party’s “staggering defeat” in 1959 was the source of its crisis. The opposition had been “relegated” to it. By exploiting minority discontent within the Western Region, the NCNC had made impressive inroads into its regional heartland, securing 21 seats in the AG’s political turf[41]. Leading Yoruba personalities interpreted the AG’s opposition role as a defeat for the entire ethnic group, which was especially damaging to Awolowo’s leadership of the party.
The party quickly split apart under the crushing weight of dissatisfaction. Awolowo and his deputy, Akintola, who was also the Premier of the Western Region, developed simmering tension throughout 1960 and 1961.
The party’s ideological orientation was the first source of tension. Awolowo had come to the conclusion that the AG could recover and expand its support base after losing the election by intensifying its attacks on social inequality, sharpening its socialist rhetoric, and radicalizing its message. Awolowo reasoned that the party would be able to break out of its regional box and gain cross-ethnic support from workers and the underprivileged nationwide if it adopted such an ideologically radical stance. Because of this, he was at odds with Akintola and many of the party’s elites, who were regionalists and focused on maintaining the status quo. In addition, it put him at odds with the “Yoruba businessmen and merchants at the party’s financial core,” who were concerned that Awolowo would lead the AG down communist lines.
Awolowo and Akintola were further at odds due to disagreements regarding the party’s strategy. Awolowo and his group argued that only a double strategy of confronting the NPC in parliament and luring the NCNC into a “progressive coalition” could stifle Northern power and guarantee Yoruba elites a seat at the federal table. On the other hand, Akintola and his group argued that Yorubas should be moderate toward the NPC because it was the ruling party in government and had access to the “privileges and benefits in the federation.”
The conflict over regional and party control between Awolowo, who maintained a firm hand in the Western Region to prevent his deputy from “wrestling control of the party,” and Akintola, who desired to strike out on his own and emerge from the shadow of his party boss, exacerbated the growing division within the party. Awolowo’s “insatiable desire to run the government of which I am head from outside” was said to have enraged Akintola.
At the party congress in February 1962, as Awolowo attempted to reassert his control over the AG, the simmering tension finally came to a head. He arranged a series of motions that resulted in “critical changes” in the party’s operation. The party’s “Federal Executive Committee” (FEC), the party’s primary decision-making body, was strengthened by amending the party constitution to weaken the Regional Premier’s (Akintola) role and strengthen the President’s (Awolowo) role. Awolowo’s supporters also “scored a clean sweep of the elections for major party offices,” according to the report.
Awolowo moved in for the kill as Akintola licked his wounds, having lost his power and pride after the party congress. It appeared that the time had come to remove his frail rival from office. He persuaded the party to remove Akintola as Premier and party deputy in May, just three months after the party congress. Akintola, unsurprisingly, refused to die quietly. “Vowing a fight to the finish,” he said, “he challenged the constitutionality of his removal in court.”
It was evident by this point that the disintegrating AG and the widening divide in the Yoruba elite’s unity were becoming a “threat to peace and order in the West.” As the power struggle between the two men and their factions spilled out into the streets, violent riots broke out across the region. With cautious optimism, the NPC and NCNC observed the increasing fragmentation of their Western rival. They were of the opinion that the internal party conflict would make the West more accessible, allowing them to expand their influence in the area. The NPC party chairman and Premier of the North, Ahmadu Bello, even made a public declaration of support for the troubled Akintola.
On May 25, when the Awolowo faction attempted to have the regional parliament vote for Alhaji Adegbenro, the new Regional Premier, the conflict between the two factions reached its zenith. Physical violence broke out during the parliamentary procedure. Parliamentarians from the Akintola faction, supported by NCNC members of the Western regional assembly, used violent disruption to prevent Adegbenro from being sworn in, realizing that they would lose any vote because they were in the minority.
The scene in parliament was described by British political scientist John Mackintosh, who was teaching at the time at the University of Ibadan:
After prayers, the House of Assembly met at 9 a.m., and as Chief Odebiyi stood to make the first motion, a supporter of Chief Akintola, Mr. E. O. Oke, jumped on the table and yelled, “There is fire on the mountain.” He continued to scatter chairs throughout the room. Mr. E. Ebubedike, who was also a supporter of Chief Akintola, took the mace and tried to hit the speaker with it, but he missed and the mace fell to the ground. Except for one member, who was struck with a chair and retaliated, the Alhaji Adegbenro supporters sat quietly as instructed. The opposition joined in as Mr. Akinyemi (NCNC) and Messrs. Adigun and Adeniya (pro-Akintola) continued to throw chairs, causing such disorder that the Nigerian police used tear gas to clear the House.
Sir Tafawa Balewa, the Prime Minister, provided an even more graphic account of the events:
While the Attorney General was reeling from this assault, the two governing parties escalated the offensive by establishing a commission of inquiry known as “the Coker Commission” in June to investigate allegations of public funds misappropriation in the Western Region. The Commission found Awolowo guilty of “trying to build a financial empire through abuse of his official position” and embezzling millions of dollars and overdrafts from government companies and parastatals. By 1962, the Western Region Marketing Board, the wealthiest of the three regional marketing boards, “had to borrow to perform its own routine operations” due to the Awolowo and AG party stalwarts’ drain on regional funds.
Although there was “little surprise or shock among AG supporters” at the scale of the fraud that was found, and while few people questioned Awolowo’s central role in the scandal, many people believed that the Commission’s findings were selective and motivated by a political agenda. First of all, because he was the party deputy and Regional Premier while the region’s funds were being diverted to fund party activities, its complete exoneration of Akintola from any financial crimes struck many as absurd. Additionally, the majority of observers believed that the same level of public funds abuse would have been discovered if a comparable investigation had been conducted into the finances of the other two regions.
The Coker Commission’s revelations damaged Awolowo and the AG’s reputation, so the Emergency Administrator gradually eased Akintola’s supporters’ restrictions on AG members while tightening Awolowo’s restrictions[65]. As a result, Akintola was able to reunite his supporters; preparing him for his eventual return to his position as Premier.
In an effort to save their political careers, many Awolowo supporters defected to Akintola’s side under relentless pressure. Some Awolowo supporters began secretly plotting the overthrow of the government as evidence increased that Akintola, supported by federal might, would be reinstated as Regional Premier without reelection after the Emergency period ended.
A police informant, however, discovered the plot.
The uncovered plot was “revealed to a stunned nation” by the Prime Minister in September 1962. “Conspiracy to stage a coup d’état” and “treasonable felony” charges were brought against Awolowo and the AG’s depleted leadership in November, and they are currently in prison. The NPC-NCNC federal government made the announcement in December that the party would no longer be recognized as the official opposition.
Samuel Ladoke Akintola (R) and Remi Fani-Kayode Samuel Ladoke Akintola (L) and Remi Fani-Kayode The rapidly disintegrating AG did not receive any relief in 1963. Akintola was re-installed as Regional Premier without an election on January 1 to the surprise of few. Alhaji Adgbenro, the party’s candidate, would almost certainly have won an election, reviving the AG’s faltering fortunes. Akintola’s alliance with the NCNC, one of the governing duo, was the only thing that made his return possible. Akintola gave his Eastern ally a “generous share of power in the West” in return, which led to the NCNC taking over numerous ministerial portfolios in the region. Akintola was compelled, as part of the deal, to accept the division of the West, which was more serious for the Yorubas because of the ethno-regional balance of power. In the end, this would result in the August creation of a new region for the West’s minorities, the Mid-West.
Minority issues plagued every region. The Ibibios, Efiks, and Ijaws, to name just a few, all held separatist views against their tyrannical Igbo rulers in the East. In addition, “escalating political repression” in the North sparked open rebellion in the Tiv regions twice, in 1960 and 1964.
Two events finally ended the AG’s credibility as a national force after the partition and as its destruction neared completion.
The official publication of the Coker Commission report in January 1963 provided the federal government led by the NPC-NCNC and the Western Regional government led by Akintola with the legal cover they needed to seize the AG’s assets and dismantle its “commercial and financial” networks, both of which caused “real damage” to the party. Additionally, on September 11, Awolowo and his accomplices were finally convicted of the treasonable felony charge and given a ten-year prison term. The AG’s highest levels were effectively eliminated as a result.
In his book “Class, Ethnicity, and Democracy in Nigeria,” the renowned political scientist Larry Diamond of Stanford University summed up the demise of the AG as follows:
The scale and breadth of the defeat that the NPC and the NCNC inflicted on Chief Awolowo and his AG supporters was simply staggering. In addition to losing the power struggle in the West, the Awolowo Action Group was also destroyed as an effective opposition force. The AG’s demise resulted in immediate realignments in the political constellation. Akintola broke off his alliance with the NCNC, fired members of the NCNC from the regional cabinet, formed a new party called the Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP), and re-aligned it with the NPC as his grip on the West grew. He had probably always wanted to be as close to federal power as possible, and this was arguably where he was. He probably calculated that he could rebuild the West’s shattered position and bring the Yorubas back to parity in the ethno-regional balance with the support of the dominant party in government. More fundamentally, the battle changed from a tripolar conflict to a bipolar one when one pole, the AG, gave way. Due to the AG’s demise as a national political force, the two governing parties now faced off against one another in direct and increasingly tense battles. Between the NPC and the NCNC, deep cracks appeared, resembling an earthquake’s aftermath.
It became abundantly clear that the NPC had received the greatest gain as the crisis subsided. The southern dream of an east-west “progressive alliance” against Northern hegemony was dashed when Akintola’s NNDP gained control of the Western Region and became a dependent ally. Their party now had a small working majority in parliament due to the fact that 16 independent parliamentarians had joined the NPC earlier in 1961. The NCNC’s “extractive capacity” and leverage over the federal government were effectively destroyed as a result of these developments, reducing its power and confidence.
Nigeria was now poised for sole captaincy by the Northern Region. “There should not be anyone State [or Region] so much more powerful than the rest as to be capable of vying in strength with many of them combined,” was one of the conditions that John Stuart Mill outlined in his 1861 Considerations on Representative Government for a stable federation. If there is such a thing, it will insist on controlling the group discussions.
Michael Okpara, the Eastern Regional Premier, attempted to “drawback” from the “total extinction” of the AG after lately recognizing that the emerging political balance would be detrimental to the East. However, Maitama Sule, who was an NPC Federal Minister at the time, remarked with breath-taking confidence after observing the changes: The NPC will soon be in charge of Nigeria as a whole.
The subsequent crisis of the First Republic took place against this backdrop.
2. The nation was getting ready for its first census as an independent nation in May 1962, just as the AG crisis was reaching its zenith. Prior to the 1959 election, the distribution of parliamentary seats was based on the results of the most recent census, which was carried out between the years 1952 and 1953 under British supervision. This census was largely responsible for Northern power and the NPC’s dominance. As a result, when a new census was scheduled in 1962, its meaning was inevitably shaped by its implications for the power balance between ethnic groups and regions.
The elites of Yoruba and Igbo, in particular, saw the census as a chance to close the demographic gap between the North and the South, thereby improving the precarious situation. They reasoned that power relations between the three regions would level out and the “basis of Northern domination would be permanently removed” if the population count could be turned in the South’s favor. The future formula for allocating revenue and the quota for recruitment into state structures like the Armed Forces and the Federal Civil Service would also be determined by the census. The census created an atmosphere of “feverish competition” as ethnic champions mobilized their constituents for the upcoming contest, which was not surprising given the stakes. Diamond, for instance, states that in the South:
The people were being urged “not to be left out” by politicians as they went around their districts. In addition to seat allocation, it was suggested that scholarships and other perks would be distributed based on popularity; consequently, there was every reason to strive for “a good result.” Leaders of ethnic groups and politicians were “out to win” and “their campaign was only too successful.”
The fact that many southerners believed the 1952-53 census, which had been conducted by colonial authorities, was “grossly inaccurate…and deliberately falsified by the British to ensure Northern dominance” also increased expectations of a “good result” in the South. The notion that British colonial officers “naturally inclined towards the North” persists. The belief that the combined southern regions could anticipate better population numbers with generally better health care than the North and a more “rapid decline in infant mortality” added to the positive expectations of the south.
Beginning in May 1962, the census was counted over two weeks. It became immediately clear as the numbers came in that there had been some implausible increases between the previous census and this one. Nevertheless, the North’s 33% increase broadly matched the UN’s demographic projections. The West and East had both achieved astonishment-inducing gains of 72% and 70%, respectively. For instance, there were increases ranging from 120 percent to 200 percent in some parts of the Eastern Region. With these staggering rises, either the southern regions had surpassed all previous records for human reproduction or “statistical surgery” had taken place. The latter explanation was chosen by the chief census officer. He stated, referring to the particularly startling figures coming from the Eastern Region, that:
Several checks could be applied to the five Eastern divisions that had seen increases of more than 120% in ten years… Most tellingly, the biggest increase was in children under the age of five, and calculations showed that if all women of childbearing age had been pregnant for all five previous years, they would not have produced this many births.
The chief census officer’s report, which was sent to the government, said that the process had caused a lot of population growth, and it suggested that verifications be done in some places to save the census’s credibility. To prevent riots over the new figures, the government concealed the fraudulent census result as it prepared for verification checks.
Michael Okpara broke away from the group and made the announcement that the Eastern Region now had 12.4 million people according to the census. He insisted that his Regional government would stick to this number regardless of what the results of any verification exercise would be. Despite this, verification checks and recounts continued, and northern leaders quickly restored the balance by “discovering” an additional 8.5 million people from the north.
This increased the north’s population to a new total of 31 million, up from the initial 22.5 million, which was sufficient to maintain its dominant position. The NCNC was the first in the south to reject the verification exercise’s findings completely. The NCNC pushed for the release of the original census result while the NPC supported the authenticity of the verification checks, resulting in the breakdown of the governing alliance. The 1962 results were canceled because of this impasse, and a new census was scheduled for the second half of 1963.
The census of 1963 turned out to be an even worse failure. Even more pronounced were the political stakes associated with this subsequent census. Ethnic political security took center stage with the 1964 general election just under a year away and the increased sense of insecurity in the south due to the NPC’s growing power. Ethnic champions once more mobilized their constituents in the Eastern and Western Regions to achieve a “good result.” The initial use of restraints was dropped. Regional leaders in the North were determined not to be caught napping in the 1963 rerun because they had been late to the inflation game in 1962. For instance, Eastern inspectors’ trains reportedly derailed while they were on their way to check Northern numbers. It seems that livestock was counted as a part of the human population in some places. Additionally, “travelers and passers-by” were included in the settled population. All four regions performed double counting (the Mid-Western Region had already been established by this point).
The government refused to immediately release the results of the 1963 census once more, despite bitter accusations that each region had significantly overestimated its population. Although the official numbers for the 1963 census were never made public, reports quickly spread that the number had reached an incredible 60.5 million. This meant that 15 million more Nigerians had been added to the total from the 1962 census, which was notoriously overstated. Privately, ethnic elites from all regions were hard at work to get the best numbers for their constituents, while the government pleaded for time to conduct “exhaustive tests” on the data it had received.
The public was informed of the compromise’s outcome on February 24, 1964: Nigerians were expected to number 55.6 million, 10 million more than in 1962. The East retained its 1962 count of 12.4 million; The “discovered” 8.5 million Northerners were reduced by the North to a respectable 7.3 million, bringing its total population to 29.8 million; The West’s population increased by 2.5 million from 1962, reaching 10.3 million; The Mid-West was permitted to increase its population by 300,000, to 2.5 million; likewise, 665,000 people were “counted” for Lagos. The North had maintained its steady population majority.
As tensions resurfaced within the ruling alliance, even this compromise was insufficient to soothe frayed nerves. The NCNC said that the NPC had released the figures on its own before consultations were over and final agreements were reached. As a result, Michael Okpara in the East deemed the figures from February 1964 to be “worse than useless.” Similar to his Eastern ally, Dennis Osadebay, the Mid-West’s Premier and NCNC member, referred to the figures as “the most stupendous joke of our age.” Akintola in the West, whose position as Regional Premier depends on the NPC, accepted the results.
Using its control over the Federal Government, the NPC coerced Osadebay into abandoning his Eastern ally and following the government’s line by threatening to withdraw federal aid from the Mid-West, a move that would have financially crippled the new region, as the NCNC worked to overturn the 1963 results. Michael Okpara was eventually forced to accept the new figures as well, as the Eastern Region was isolated and the NCNC consensus was broken. The power imbalance was now more severe than ever.
All eyes were on the upcoming major event, which was less than ten months away, as the nation let out a sigh of relief at having survived another crisis that had severely strained the republic’s unity and stability: the general election of 1964. The election represented the last chance for Southern elites to halt the momentum of the NPC. However, there was a widespread expectation among northern elites that the election would replicate their federal dominance. Alhaji Kokori Abdul, the Northern House of Assembly’s parliamentary secretary, stated just a few months prior to the election:
I have no doubt at all that the Northern People’s Congress has arrived, will remain, and will continue to rule Nigeria forever.
It should have been obvious to the nation’s leaders that the First Republic could not withstand another political crisis because the effects of the previous two crises had widened the system’s cracks. And it is true that the revolutions that broke out in 1964 and 1965 eventually led to the disastrous fall of the republic in 1966.
3. The General Strike, June 1-13, 1964 The First Republic was effectively at a turning point in its political life by 1964. Political instability brought on by the nation’s elites’ competition for state power had accompanied its birth. At the beginning of the year, when the census crisis finally came to an end, everyone immediately turned their attention to the upcoming general election on December 30. The long-running census crisis had progressively widened the divide between the NPC and the NCNC, whereas the AG’s demise as a national political force had caused deep divisions within the ruling coalition. The shaky coalition that was in charge would eventually be broken by the general strike.
After approximately a year of brinkmanship over the issue of a living wage for workers, the country’s labor unions came together under the banner of a Joint Action Committee (JAC) and declared a general strike on June 1. As approximately 750,000 of the nation’s estimated one million wage laborers gave up their tools and refused to work for thirteen days, economic activity was paralyzed and “essential services [brought] to a virtual standstill.” The fact that only about 300,000 of the 750,000 strikers belonged to the labor unions that had called the strike is evidence of the strike’s widespread support.
The government began negotiations with the JAC after a week of protests and strike action. However, on June 9th, the talks came to a standstill. The JAC demanded the Prime Minister “resign within 48 hours” or return to the negotiation table in defiance. Calculating that the strike action’s tidal wave of discontent could be used as an electoral advantage, NCNC leaders abandoned the government’s position and openly supported the striking workers. The open support of the JAC by the NCNC effectively ended the governing alliance for good.
The government, which by this point was effectively the NPC alone, finally gave in to the demands for salary increases on the 13th, bringing an end to the 13-day strike. The strikers’ confidence and support base had grown. In his book Urban Politics in Nigeria, Howard Wolpe argues that the threat of a “local police uprising in Lagos” in support of the striking workers was another factor that compelled the NPC to take action, in addition to the NCNC’s defection and the growing risks of a larger social revolt.
On the surface, workers’ demands for a new minimum wage in both the private and public sectors led to the strike. But on a deeper level, it was also a reflection of the general public’s dissatisfaction with corruption, growing economic inequality, and the political elites’ apparent inability to deliver independence’s benefits. The First Republic’s legitimacy had been seriously eroded by 1964 as a result of widespread corruption, ministerial waste, and the corrosive effects of ethnic politics. Any “domestic capital that could be mobilized” for investment was greatly strained by the “spreading virus of corruption” and the “immense salaries at the bloated higher ranks of government.” There were a lot of bribes for government contracts. The privileged showed off their illegal wealth, highlighting the widespread sense of moral decay and social injustice.
Festus Okotie-Eboh, the Finance minister, best exemplified the First Republic’s issue with widespread corruption. Because of his fame, a foreign official reportedly painted this unflattering picture of him:
Chief Festus Okotie-Eboh was a squalid crook who brought Nigeria down to his level. He dragged Nigeria into the sewer, but because of his corruption, there are no sewers in Nigeria. His name had become synonymous with corruption in Lagos. They still need to be paid for with money in Swiss banks.
Diamond made the following observations in his insightful assessment of the general strike:
It was more than just a strike by Nigerian workers to demand higher wages; it was a broad challenge to the political class as a whole and its ruling authority, as well as a challenge to the entire structure of inequality in Nigerian society. The glaring levels of corruption and extravagant spending by the nation’s political elite were the focus of union leaders’ protest. The widespread and spontaneous outpouring of popular support for the strike in the majority of Nigerian cities was fueled by this larger issue.
4. The General Election in December 1964 A deeper, more fundamental divide reasserted itself just as the strike’s widespread popularity appeared to foretell a new dividing line along class lines. The elites increased their appeals to ethnic identity on the campaign trail in ways that strained the fragile national bond in order to secure their share of the vote.
In the Western Region, for instance, Akintola constantly stoked fears of Igbo dominance in order to maintain the NNDP’s declining support. He argued that because Yoruba elites were stuck in opposition, Igbo leaders had used federal patronage to force their ethnic kin into senior government positions, harming the Yoruba nation. He put it thus:
Western Nigeria has been replaced by relatives, tribesmen, and clansmen of the eastern NCNC chairman, who shout the slogan of one Nigeria more than anyone else, despite our wealth and high social advancement. As a result, they have become a mere appendage in the community of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.
In response, Igbo leaders urged members of their ethnic group to vote for the NCNC and “rally to the defense of their embattled people.” While AG leaders, not to be outdone by their rivals, pledged to “end… Hausa-Fulani domination” in an effort to secure votes from the northern minority.
The resulting shift in party alignments made the political climate even more volatile. A powerful gravitational pull was exerted on the political space by the NPC-NCNC confrontations over the years and the final collapse of the governing coalition following the general strike in June. As a result, two opposing alliances for the upcoming election emerged: The United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA), which is led by the NCNC and consists of the AG and other smaller parties from the north, and the Nigerian National Alliance (NNA), which is led by the NPC and includes Akintola’s NNDP and other minority parties from the South.
The two opposing alliances essentially represented a “North-South constellation of forces,” despite this apparent national coalition. The NPC was at the center of the NNA. The Hausa-Fulani elites realized that while hegemony in the Northern Region could deliver the Nigerian state to them, extending their power through proxy into the Southern regions would enable them to better consolidate their federal dominance, which is why it formed an alliance with ethnic minority parties outside of its region. In a similar vein, despite the fact that the NCNC served as the foundation of the UPGA, the NCNC’s strategy of reaching out to radicals and minorities in the northern region was driven by an acute fear of the NPC’s growing power. This was a matter of ethnic political safety for UPGA party leaders. They could only hope to prevent the NPC from taking full control of the state by entering the north, according to simple arithmetic.
The breakdown in the unity of the Yoruba elite added complexity and tension; a repercussion from the power struggle between Awolowo and Akintola. Alhaji Adegbenro now leads the broken AG remnants, who saw the election as a chance to regain control of the Western Region. The party decided to join the UPGA coalition because, like the majority of Yorubas, it concluded that full NPC control of Nigeria was harmful to the Yoruba nation’s interests. On the other hand, the NNDP joined the NNA coalition because it was reliant on the NPC to rule the Western Region and because Akintola believed that only an alliance with the NPC could protect the Yorubas’ long-term interests. Additionally, Akintola viewed the election as an opportunity to end the AG’s reign of terror and establish his hegemony in the Western Region.
Both coalitions used strong-arm tactics and violence in their electoral campaigns. In order to intimidate supporters of the opposition, thugs were readily hired. Opponents of politics were beaten up. Particularly, the NPC made full use of its advantage as incumbents by imprisoning opposition candidates or supporters for the smallest violations. Both coalitions were said to sometimes resort to the “physical elimination of opposition candidates” in strategic areas where the stakes were too high. The thuggery and hooliganism that characterized the lead-up to the election is exemplified by the desperate appeal that the Inspector General of Police made to the supporters of the opposing parties:
Don’t carry broken bottles, hatchets, or sticks with you, and don’t set fire to the cars of your political opponents.
The army heard the first “rumblings of a possible military coup” as the situation seemed to spiral out of control. On his 60th birthday in November, the Federal President of Nigeria, Nnamdi Azikiwe, confessed to an interviewer that “what is happening in Nigeria today does not inspire me to be optimistic that we shall survive as a nation.” Azikiwe was disturbed by the events that were taking place. He then gave a dramatic dawn broadcast on December 10 warning that the nation’s unity was in danger:
If this embryonic Republic must disintegrate, I have only one request for our politicians: in the name of God, let the procedure be quick and painless. Additionally, I have one piece of advice for our politicians: Before they seal their doom by satisfying their lust for office, if they have decided to destroy our national unity, they should convene a roundtable conference to decide how our national assets should be divided… It is better for us and our many admirers abroad that we disintegrate peacefully rather than in pieces.
Sadly, even such a solemn intervention was unable to stem the rising tide of lawlessness and violence. The Western and Northern Premiers, Ahmadu Bello and Akintola, backed Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa, who called the allegations of electoral fraud “unjust” and “groundless.” They were absolutely certain that they would out-rig the UPGA rivals in the upcoming election given their party’s federal incumbency advantage. Half of the Federal Election Commission’s members resigned in protest of the NNA’s unwavering commitment to holding the election. Due to their inability to match the NNA’s disruptive strategies, UPGA leaders decided to boycott the election. It turned out to have been a hasty and foolish choice.
On December 30, the elections took place as planned. Because the UPGA was not there, there was a lot of room for NNA candidates to beat everyone else. The NPC obtained 162 of the 167 seats available in the Northern region. If the results are true, the NPC would now be able to run the Federation on its own. The Federal Parliament needed 157 seats to have a majority.
The NCNC was successful in preventing voting in the Eastern Region. UPGA leaders called off the boycott and sent out their candidates while in the Western and Mid-West Regions. They were alarmed by the prospect of being completely erased from the political map and realized that it had made serious mistakes. It was too late for the call-off to turn the party’s favor. The “electoral process was so abused” in particular in the Western Region that, despite its extreme unpopularity, the NNDP won just 63% of the seats in that region (36 seats out of 57 seats allotted to the region: (See Table 2) The results were immediately rejected by UPGA leaders, who demanded new elections.
Tafawa Balewa asked the President to appoint him once more as Prime Minister after the NNA coalition won a historic “victory” at the polls. On January 1, 1965, Azikiwe declined, harshly criticizing the “conduct and outcome” of the election; Instead, he told Balewa that the elections were “unsatisfactory in view of the violations of freedom that have occurred in recent weeks” and threatened to resign if the results were not changed and new elections were called. As Azikiwe and Tafawa Balewa fought “for control and support of the armed forces,” the First Republic “teetered on the edge of an abyss” without a government for four days. Balewa told the Chief Justice that he intended to nominate a new President to succeed Azikiwe, and there were calls for Azikiwe to assume executive power and select a Prime Minister of his choice. The dangers of a civil war grew, and secessionist rhetoric got louder.
The President finally gave in on January 4 after hearing legal advice from the country’s top judges that the armed forces were legally obligated to obey the Prime Minister alone in the event of conflicting orders and hearing rumors that the Prime Minister planned to orchestrate his removal by “having him declared medically incapacitated.” Azikiwe agreed to invite Balewa to form a new government as part of the so-called “Zik-Balewa pact” in exchange for Balewa agreeing to the following conditions: 1) put together a “broad-based government” with opposition members in the cabinet; 2) reschedule the March elections in the Eastern Region that have been boycotted; and (3) hold new elections in October to select a new Premier for the Western Region’s House of Assembly.
In the Eastern Region, the rescheduled election went off without a hitch. By appealing to Igbo unity, the NCNC was able to easily win 91% of the seats in that Region. The “Pact” stipulated that many newly elected NCNC members would be incorporated into the federal government, bringing the total number of ministers in the federal cabinet to an “unprecedented size of eighty.” In his book The History of Nigeria, Falola makes the following pointed remark regarding this development: Every “big politician” had become a shareholder, and the government had now become a holding company.
5. The Western Regional Election in October 1965 Unfortunately, the disaster of the 1964 election did not put a good stop to the nation’s leaders’ “win-at-all-costs mentality.”
One of the pillars of the Zik-Balewa agreement was a rerun of the Western regional election. As a condition for accepting the results of the 1964 election, the NCNC had demanded that a regional election be held to elect a new Premier. They were confident that their Western ally, the AG, would be able to remove the NNDP from the region in a free and fair election, with Alhaji Adegbenro taking Akintola’s place as Premier. Their hopes were dashed in a flash. Akintola was not prepared to give up power without fighting hard.
The fraud and violence that characterized the Western election in 1965 prevailed over the general election in 1964 due to two factors working together. First, in contrast to the other three regions—Northern, Eastern, and Mid-Western—which were effectively “one-party states,” intra-elite conflict in the West meant that two parties—the NNDP and the AG—representing the competing elite factions were “engaged in a deadly rivalry” for political survival. Diamond’s quote:
Action Group leaders were aware that the Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP), Chief Akintola’s ruling party, would use regional power ruthlessly to eliminate their party even if it won a full five-year term. In contrast, the Akintola forces anticipated that, in the event of defeat, they would be victimized by their own tactics and would not have a genuine base of popular support to rely on.
The second factor was the election’s “critical importance… to the game plans” of leaders in the Northern and Eastern Regions, despite the fact that it appeared to be a Western regional affair. The NPC would be able to strengthen its grip on the federal government with the help of a willing ally in the West. In contrast, the NCNC would benefit from the alliance of a resurgent and powerful AG, which would serve as the necessary counterweight against the approaching NPC hegemony.
Akintola turned to ethnic mobilization to bolster his support, acutely aware of his weak hand. He shined his spotlight on public institutions in the region where Igbo people held senior positions and led the protests against their removal. One such establishment was the University of Lagos, where a Yoruba man took over for the Vice-Chancellor after he was fired. However, Akintola used his incumbency advantage to full effect, knowing that ethnic chauvinism rhetoric alone would not be enough to prevent the AG from winning: preventing AG candidates from participating in campaign events and intimidating supporters from attending rallies. The NNDP camp was certain that only “wholesale electoral fraud” could save them from a humiliating election defeat.
The riggings that took place very few people were surprised by when the election actually happened. However, the NNDP’s brazenness and impunity in rigging its members back into parliament was what enraged many and may have contributed to the outbreak of violence that followed the election. For instance, the NNDP simply had many of its newly “elected” parliamentarians declared “unopposed” winners in radio stations rather than dealing with the logistical hassle of inflating disagreeable figures that had been announced at polling stations. With a statement that he “had no confidence in the conduct of the elections,” the Chairman of the Electoral Commission resigned in protest.
The AG tried to sworn in Adegbenro as Premier while disregarding the flagrantly fraudulent results that were broadcast on the radio. This led to Adegbenro’s arrest for “illegal assumption of office.” The streets were filled with AG supporters. Unprecedented violence erupted throughout the entire Western region. The loss of life and property was widespread. In what they dubbed “Operation Wetie,” which translates to “wet with petrol and burn,” political thugs began burning people and properties, particularly those belonging to Hausa-Fulani settlers and supporters of the NNDP.
The Prime Minister refused to impose a State of Emergency in the Western Region, as he had done in 1962 during the AG crisis, or at the very least call in the army to restore order as the region descended into chaos. Since then, some have argued that Tafawa Balewa did not want to declare a State of Emergency because his party was allied with the NNDP and did not want to remove it from power so soon after its “election.” In a similar vein, it has been argued that his belief that many of the soldiers stationed in the region were sympathetic to the opposition’s cause influenced his decision not to call in the military. Others have maintained that the government’s indecisiveness was due to the fact that it was “waiting for the crisis to escalate to a point that would justify the use of the armed forces as an army of occupation in the Western Region,” as one source put it.
In any case, the tragic political drama of Nigeria’s First Republic ended with the so-called “election” of October 1965 and the subsequent outbreak of violence. Diamond argues that:
The 1965 “election” in the West, which appeared to obliterate any remaining vestige of the Republic’s democratic character, irrevocably shattered any remaining faith that the various social elements had in the institutions of the First Republic.
Kaduna Nzeogwu
On January 15, 1966, elements of the army attempted to lead a military revolution. They struck with deadly force, destroying the highest levels of the Republic. The First Republic was officially ended on January 16 when the army chief took over as head of state. The Prime Minister (Tafawa Balewa), Finance Minister (Okotie-Eboh), Premiers of the Northern and Western Regions (Ahmadu Bello) and seven senior military officers had all been shot to death by the time the final mutineers had surrendered to the new military government on January 17th.
A democratic Republic that had begun with a great deal of promise was brought to an unfortunate end by the bloody coup on January 15, 1966, led by Kaduna Nzeogwu.
